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This paper examines how economic globalization affects work-place arrangements regulating 
working time in industrialized countries. Exposure to foreign direct investment and trade can have 
off-setting effects for work-place bargaining over standard hours and work-time flexibilization, and 
can be expected to more strongly spur the latter than the former given stronger employer support 
for and weaker employee opposition to flexible time management in open economies. The paper 
also considers, however, how works council or other work-place representation likely mediate 
which of globalization’s effects dominates the shaping of work-time.  Based on enterprise-level panel 
data from the German Federal Labor Office, the analysis supports two major findings consistent 
with such expectations.   First, globalization measured at the establishment or branch level – 
including total foreign direct investment (FDI), trade, and export orientation (share of foreign sales) 
– tends to have either no or weakly negative effects on total standard working hours, but to yield 
higher incidence of overtime, temporary and fixed-contract work.  Second, works councils mediate 
these effects in ways that differ between standard hours and flexibilization. With respect to standard 
weekly hours, globalization measures tend to trigger more standard hours among firms without 
works councils, but fewer hours among firms with works councils. With respect to flexibilization, 
however, globalization tends to modestly spur incidence of temporary- or fixed-term contracts and 
overtime, and to do so more strongly where works councils are present than when they are not.  
These results suggest how economic openness can have important, uneven consequences for 
working time, and that firm-level institutional context can channel those consequences, highlighting 
an area of agency in responses to globalization. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
“Globalization closes in on Swedes’treasured vacation,” reports a recent headline from the 
International Herald Tribune (IHT 20/8/07).  “Eastern Europe's low costs erode Germans' 35-hour 
workweek,” chimes another headline, from the Christian Science Monitor (CSM 24/8/04).  Lending 
color to such headlines, New York Times editorialist Thomas Friedman quipped that “…French 
voters are trying to preserve a 35-hour work week in a world where Indian engineers are ready to 
work a 35-hour day. Good luck.” (NYT 3/6/05).  These popular-press missives remind us that 
working time is a much-talked about aspect of working life, not least because pressures to work 
more hours, more weeks, more years, more flexibly are clear trends throughout the industrialized 
world – painfully so for more “social” European economies.  They also remind us of the link, so 
commonly made in the popular press, between working-time developments and economic 
globalization.  Whether they lament and resist or celebrate and recommend such developments, 
most of the popular press and many policymakers and commentators link increases in working 
hours and job flexibilization to the competitive exigencies of globalized trade and production.  The 
globally-integrated economy, in a nut-shell, means more sweat. 
 
Academic scholarship on working time and on globalization, meanwhile, provides surprisingly little 
guidance as to whether such tales capture important truths or are just that – tales of exaggerated 
and misdirected concern.  There are studies where measures of globalization appear to ratchet-up 
working time and flexibilization, though the findings are clearly circumscribed in their focus on 
particular industries or occupations (Blair-Loy and Jacobs 2003; Raess and Burgoon 2006).  A few 
studies draw the opposite, more “globaphilic,” conclusion, that globalization increases firm 
profitability that gets passed on to workers in the form of wages and benefits, sooner decreasing 
than increasing working hours (Flanagan 2006).  Far more common is the largely implicit view that 
globalization is modest enough, or has modest or off-setting or place-specific enough effects for 
working time, that globalization can be ignored as an important determinant of working-time 
arrangements. Most studies of working time, hence, have given little attention to global economic 
developments, focusing instead on individual or industry attributes or national-level economic or 
policy changes (c.f. Bosch and Lendorff 2001; Prescott 2003; Alesina et al. 2005).  And the enormous 
globalization literature has focused on many consequences for industrial relations and political 
economy – from wage bargaining to union strength – but very little on working time (Schmitt 2003; 
Thelen and Kume 1999; Looise and Drucker, 2003; Kurdelbusch 2002). 
 
These various perspectives constitute the beginnings of a literature on globalization and working 
time, providing good reasons to expect globalization to have off-setting consequences for work-B. Burgoon, D. Raess 
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place working time.  But they provide little theoretical development beyond such beginnings.  For 
instance, no studies to our knowledge theoretically try to understand why one or another of 
globalization’s effects might dominate or to identify third conditions that might mediate which 
dominates.  More fundamentally, we have very little empirical work on globalization and working 
time.  The handful of such studies tend to focus either on how globalization measures affect 
aggregate national hours (Flanagan 2006) or particular occupations (Blair-Loy and Jacobs 2003) – 
saying little about other aspects of working time, such as overtime and the incidence of temporary 
or fixed-term work, and about the work-time patterns at the level of establishments where crucial 
work-time and flexibilization standards are set.  Our own earlier study did address how globalization 
affects working time and other work-place arrangements (Raess and Burgoon 2006) but surveyed 
only a small sample of enterprises within a particular industry, hampering economy-wide conclusions 
about globalization and working time. 
 
In the hope of redressing such shortcomings, this paper develops and empirically tests arguments 
about how globalization affects work-place working time, sensitive to globalization’s possible off-
setting effects for various work-time arrangements across a nation’s full range of industries and 
services.  The theoretical expectation is two-fold.  First, exposure to international trade and foreign 
direct investment unleash off-setting pressures to increase and to decrease standard hours and 
work-hour flexibilization, with the pressures to increase work-hour flexibilization being stronger 
than is the case for standard hours – given the varying preferences workers and employers can be 
expected to have over standard hours and over flexibilization, respectively.  Second, establishment-
level institutional conditions likely mediate which of globalization’s implications predominates the 
shaping of both standard hours and flexibilization.  In particular, we hypothesize that the institution 
of works councils – providing formal enterprise-level worker representation in negotiating with 
employers on non-wage work-place conditions – will tend to improve working-time conditions for 
core workers, though may also speed up and institutionalize flexibilization of such conditions as a 
palatable concession to employers in exchange for employment protections or lower standard 
hours of core workers.  These tendencies should also mediate the influence of globalization, such 
that globalization will tend to more strongly spur total working hours when works councils are 
absent than when they are present, but could increase flexibilization more strongly with than 
without works councils.   
 
To test these and other possible connections between globalization and work-place arrangements 
on working time, we analyze enterprise-level data from the German Federal Labor Office, providing 
a basis for accurately measuring how economic globalization affects standard working hours as well 
as several dimensions of job flexiblization at a level where such conditions are most directly set.                                                    Globalization and Working Time: Work-place Hours and Flexibility in Germany 
AIAS – UvA    9 
The analysis supports two major findings that broadly support expectations.   First, globalization 
measures at the establishment or branch level – including total foreign direct investment flows (FDI), 
trade openness, and export orientation (share of foreign sales) – tend in general to have either no 
or weakly negative effects for total standard working hours, but to yield higher incidence of 
overtime, temporary and fixed-contract work.  Second, works councils appear to play a strong role 
in mediating these effects in ways that differ between standard hours and flexibilization.  With 
respect to standard weekly hours, most measures of globalization tend to trigger more standard 
work hours among firms without works councils, but fewer hours among firms with works councils.  
With respect to flexibilization, however, globalization tends to spur the incidence of several 
measures of job flexibilization – particularly, temporary- or fixed-term contracts and the use of 
overtime and balancing-time accounts – and to do so more strongly where works councils are 
present than when they are not.  These results suggest that, at least in the German context, 
economic openness has important and uneven consequences for work-floor working time, and that 
firm-level institutional context channels those consequences in ways that highlight a key area of 
agency in responses to globalization. 
 
The paper builds-up to these conclusions in three steps.  The first develops expectations about how 
globalization might spur or decrease working time conditions at the enterprise level, and how works 
council representation might mediate such links.  The second introduces the IAB Betriebspanel data, 
and our specification strategy to explore these data.  A third section presents and discusses the 
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2. WORKING TIME, GLOBALIZATION, AND WORK-PLACE INSTITUTIONS 
 
Working time conditions for workers are central to the efficiency and equity of market economies.  
The conditions involve how much and under what conditions time is spent on the work floor as 
opposed to on leisure or other pursuits.  Most obviously, the issue is how much workers work in a 
day, a week, or a year – reflecting shorter or longer time off, from coffee breaks to vacation weeks.  
But also important are time-related terms of work, most obviously overtime, night- or weekend 
work, or flexible working time accounts – where hours can vary above or below standard hours 
with more or less extra compensation.  Other time-related terms involve the nature of working 
contracts, from full-time work with standardize hours, to various non-standard contracts, such as 
temporary or fixed-term contract work.   
 
Such working time conditions are set in part by decentralized and unregulated work decisions of 
employees and employers, more or less negotiated (from “fait accompli” employer standards to an 
individualized negotiated contract).  But work-hour conditions are also set by settlements 
negotiated at various levels of industrial organization.  These entail international agreements (e.g. the 
EU work time directive) involving national representatives and supra-nationally organized social 
actors (transnational union and employer federations); national work-hours legislation, involving 
political parties, lobbies and national social actors (national unions and employer associations); 
industry-wide collective bargaining, involving social actors; and firm- or enterprise-level negotiations 
by work-place representatives – such as company or works councils.  The objects of such regulated 
or de facto arrangements can be agreed-upon and actual hours-worked per week or per year, rules 
and practices on holidays, overtime, on temporary work, fixed-term contract work, part-time work, 
etc. 
 
All such working time conditions are very important to the life-chances and prospects for workers 
and to the viability and profitability of their employers – certainly as important, and occasionally as 
politicized, as wage compensation.  Although employer and employee preferences clearly vary 
substantially over time, sector, occupation, lifestyle, and space, employers tend to want the 
possibility of more hours per employee and certainly more flexibility in the setting of those hours 
(Bosch 1986, 1990; Hinrichs et al. 1991; Taddei 1998; Tijdens 2003).  Flexibility in the setting of 
hours may be particularly important to employers, concerned about being able to allocate personnel 
efficiently across highly variable monthly, seasonal, and yearly cycles of business, where just-in-time 
production chains are present – all cutting against the grain of standardized full-time contracts with 
hours limits and overtime premia (Hinrichs et al. 1991; Bosch and Lehndorff 2001).  And there is 
evidence that employers in a number of European countries are willing to swallow reductions in B. Burgoon, D. Raess 
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standard hours for full-time employees in exchange for more flexible distribution of such hours with 
respect to weekly, weekend and overtime work (Treu 1989; Bosch and Lehndorff 2001). 
 
Among employees, the preferences tend to vary more across kinds of employees and aspects of 
working time (c.f. Tijdens 2003; Väisänen and Nätti 2002).  In general, full-time employees tend to 
want lower hours at a given wage (Bielinsky, Bosch and Wagner 2002; Nätti 1995).  On measures of 
flexibilization, such as work-time accounts, and standard versus non-standard (e.g. temporary- or 
fixed-term) contracts, workers tend to be more divided, with many workers seeing benefits to 
flexibility and shorter-term arrangements (c.f. Kalleberg 2000; Krausz 2000).  But in general, surveys 
of attitudes and well-being of workers, including in a German setting, suggest that workers prefer in 
general more standard and fixed working hours and work-time contracts – hence predictable and 
easier to combine with family and other responsibilities (Beard and Edwards 1995; de Wolff 2000; 
Eberling et al. 2004). 
 
Economic globalization can be expected to have off-setting effects for such working time conditions 
in industrialized market economies.  These possible effects can be deduced from the broader 
literature on globalization and labor market conditions generally.  On the one hand, increased 
openness to and flows of capital and goods can be expected to have implications that might spell 
good news for the working time conditions of workers.  The simplest possibility in this category is 
that globalization sparks product-market specialization on the basis of comparative advantage that 
generate productivity and profitability benefits for firms and economies generally – benefits that in 
turn get passed in part onto employees in the form of more generous wages and benefits, including 
plausibly fewer and more predictable working hours for a given wage (Flanagan 2006).  Such 
tendencies might be particularly clear where globalization patterns such as FDI and outsourcing 
unleash as much or more labor complementarity as substitution, implying only modest distributional 
wage and employment effects (Hanson et al. 2001).1 But such beneficial work-time tendencies might 
emerge even if lower hours lend comparative disadvantage, and even if globalization might also yield 
significant job losses, deindustrialization and hollowing-out – so long as onshore workers remain to 
share the fruits of onshore production rendered more profitable by globalization’s process of 
specialization.  In any event, it is also possible that precisely lower such hours are or go along with a 
basis for comparative advantage in capital-rich, knowledge economies in the industrialized North – 
in which case the relationship between globalization and working time might be all the more 
beneficial for workers.  Finally, workers facing employment and wage risks due to globalization – 
                                                  
1 FDI and outsourcing, for instance, might involve tailoring to local markets (“horizontal” investment), 
resource extraction, tariff-jumping or other conditions – where the distributional consequences are more 
modest than a Stolper-Samuelson framework would imply (Markusen 1995; Dunning 1981; Hanson et al. 
2001).                                                   Globalization and Working Time: Work-place Hours and Flexibility in Germany 
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contrary to the above – might actually seek more generous working-hour arrangements as internal 
compensation for such increased risks.   
 
On the other hand, globalization might well unleash forces that yield more and more flexibilized 
working time.  To the extent that FDI and trade are driven by differences in factor endowments -- 
such as multi-nationalizing the value-added chain (sometimes called “vertical” FDI), involving 
substitution more than complementarity of global production – one might expect, following Stolper-
Samuelson reasoning, that the distributional consequences could be sharp, shifting levels of labor 
demand that entail substantial up-skilling in OECD economies (c.f. Feenstra and Hanson 1996).  This 
might lead to some room for flexibilizing for all workers, and to some sweating of less-skilled 
workers in the form of more working hours, overtime and more non-standard work-time contracts.  
Second, economic globalization of both the inter-industry and intra-industry sort, involving 
substitutes or complements, may also increase elasticity of labor demand – by virtue of making it 
easier for capital to shift foreign for domestic employment in the labor-capital mix for production – 
where the threat of exit may significantly increase wage or employment volatility and worker 
insecurity, and increase investor and employer bargaining power on non-wage working conditions 
and policies.  And all such changes might strengthen the hand of employers to call for flexibilization 
and longer hours for a given wage.  Third, economic globalization – including, again, both intra- and 
inter-industry trade and vertical and horizontal cross-border investment – can be expected to 
reduce product development and delivery times and expectations, including just-in-time practices, all 
of which can be expected to increase employer interests in particularly work-time flexibility to 
efficiently allocate human resources.   
 
Finally, regardless of actual, material effects of economic globalization, workers may perceive 
globalization to make them more vulnerable, employers may perceive globalization to require more 
flexibility, and due to globalization both might more readily look at and be aware of work-time 
conditions abroad.  Such possibilities constitute another, ideational link between globalization and 
increases in work-hours and flexibilization, at least in countries with lower hours than the OECD-
average. 
 
Which of these plausible implications of economic globalization dominates the work-time landscape 
as a generalization across time and space is difficult to predict ex ante.  We see this, therefore, as 
largely an empirical question.  But the above reasoning – and historical quid-pro-quos in employer-
employee work-time discussions – does suggest that employers are more likely to respond to 
globalization with demands for work-hour flexibilization than for increased standard hours, and that 
workers can be expected to be more split on issues of flexibilization than on issues of standard B. Burgoon, D. Raess 
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work-hours for full-time employees.  These all suggest that globalization should have a stronger 
positive (or weaker negative) effect on flexibilization than it has on standard hours. 
 
2.1. GLOBALIZATION AND WORKING TIME, MEDIATED BY WORKS COUNCILS 
 
In any event, one can expect that the implications of globalization for work time likely vary over 
time and space, depending not only on variations in the nature of globalization but also on economic 
and political-institutional features of firms and countries in which work-hours are set.  This means 
that, beyond empirically considering which of the above effects predominates, one ought also to 
consider possible mediating conditions.  Indeed, the broader literature on how globalization affect 
various features of national political economies – from industrial relations to welfare state provisions 
– have long moved beyond the possibility that globalization might have off-setting effects for such 
economies to the identification of conditions, particular national institutional settings, that might 
mediate those effects (Garrett 1998; Swank 2002; Scruggs and Lange 2002; Oskarsson 2001; Martin 
and Swank 2004).   
 
In the spirit of that literature, our own expectation is that the off-setting effects of globalization for 
working time are likely mediated by work-place institutions.  In a European context, the institutions 
that likely matter most to work-hours arrangements and to channeling how globalization might 
affect such arrangements are works councils.  Works councils are well-established and formalized 
and protected by statute in most European countries, but also exist in less formal, protected forms 
in many other OECD countries, including the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and the 
United States.  All are separate from labor unions, though many works councils have close ties with, 
and often have a membership drawn from the ranks of, the union movement.  In Germany, where 
works councils constitute one layer of its “dual system” of industrial relations, all firms with five or 
more full-time employees must be open to setting up a works council.  And in 2003, 16.5 percent of 
German firms with five or more employees had works councils, though 53 percent of all German 
employees are covered by works councils – reflecting how works council representation is much 
more common in large firms with many employees than in smaller firms (Addison et al. 2003). 
 
The intuition behind the expectation that works councils might mediate how globalization affects 
work-hours is three-fold.  First, works councils are tasked with representing workers in bargains 
with firm managers or owners over the conditions of work – and very often given particular 
responsibility for negotiating non-wage elements o f  w o r k  p a c k a g e s ,  s p e c i f i c a l l y  w o r k  t i m e  
arrangements.  Even where unions might negotiate such conditions at a national or industry level, 
works councils engage with employers in negotiating possible opt-outs or opening-clause actions on                                                   Globalization and Working Time: Work-place Hours and Flexibility in Germany 
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issues of working time.2  Second, as with other institutions affecting work-place representation, 
works councils ought to increase bargaining capacities of workers at the firm and enterprise level, 
better aggregating interests of such workers.3  And although the topic has received surprisingly little 
scholarly attention, there is some evidence that works councils do improve the conditions and rights 
of workers.   And the third intuition is that works councils not only increase capacities but also act 
as semi-autonomous organizations that might gather and disseminate information and strategies of 
employers – in any event going beyond a simple aggregation of worker interests. 
 
These three intuitions add up to the idea that works councils might influence working hours 
arrangements and mediate how globalization impacts such arrangements, but it isn’t obvious what 
direction of such mediating influence will be.  The answer, of course, depends significantly on the 
preferences and strategies of workers as principals and works-councilors as agents, over a range of 
work-place working-time arrangements under varying levels of globalization.  With respect to 
overall working hours standards for full-time workers, both workers and works councilors are likely 
to prefer lower hours, to the extent that is financially viable and not in tension with wage positions.  
This suggests as a backdrop expectation that the incidence of works council representation ought to 
correlate negatively with negotiated standard working hours, all other things equal.  It also suggests 
a first expectation for how that incidence of works councils might mediate the effects of 
globalization.  Given that works councils increase the bargaining power and representation of 
workers in enterprise-level bargaining with employers in the setting of standard hours, globalization 
ought to have less positive or more negative effects on standard hours for full time workers where 
works councils are present than when they are not.     
 
With respect to measures of work-time flexibilization, such as the incidence of temporary or fixed-
term employment, or in terms of overtime of work-time accounts, the positions of workers and of 
the works councilors representing them are less clear-cut.  There is enough diversity among 
different kinds of workers – in terms of lifestyles, gender, family-types, etc. – that one cannot 
assume that workforces or their works-councilor agents will be as unanimously or vociferously 
against such flexibilization as they are in favor of lower standard hours for full-time employees.  
                                                  
2 In a WSI (2004) survey, 26 percent of all establishments extend working time arrangements in opening 
clauses (35 percent of those making use of such opening clauses), and a higher percentage use opening clauses 
for variable working time (51 percent of all surveyed establishments, 68 percent of those with opening 
clauses). 
3 For instance, Addison et al. (2006) find that works council representation in Germany tends to increase 
wages, net of a range of other employee and establishment conditions. And an Austrian study found that 
workers in works councils are significantly less likely to be forced to work overtime (18 percent) than their 
counterparts in firms without works council representation (24 percent) (Krenn 2006).  Such benefits appear 
not to come at the expense of firm efficiency, at least in the German context where the studies have been 
most careful and extensive (e.g. Schank et al. 2004) B. Burgoon, D. Raess 
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Furthermore, flexibilization might well be a higher priority among employers than standard hours 
for core workers, such that works councilors as agents in frequent discussion with employers and 
likely sensitive to concerns about the profitability of enterprises might take a softer line on such 
flexibilization.  In general, given less clear-cut worker opposition and clearer-cut employer support 
for flexibilization, one might thus expect that globalization is likely to have a more clearly positive 
effect for flexibilization.  And on the basis of more unclear preferences of workers and works-
councilors on flexibilization, the possible role that works councils might play in steering the effects 
of globalization is likely to be more modest for flexibilization than for standard hours. 
 
The role that works councils might play in mediating how globalization affects flexibilization is 
further complicated by possibilities that works councilors might trade off the interests of workers 
on issues of flexibilization, where worker preferences can be expected to be less clear-cut, against 
other worker needs.  Most obviously, one might expect that works-councilors would be willing to 
accept some sweating on work-time issues, particularly flexibilization, if that is the price of job 
security, or of maintaining or increasing investment in onshore enterprises.  Indeed, there are case-
study histories of works-council negotiations with employers suggesting precisely such trade offs – 
such as exchanging overtime flexibilization for investments and employment protections in 
automobile plants and consumer electronics (e.g. Haipeter 2006; Bosch Press Release 2007; Raess 
and Burgoon 2006).   
 
As a variant of such strategic bargaining, one might also imagine that works councils would be willing 
to make concessions of flexibilization-related work time arrangements in exchange for protecting 
priorities on other work-time arrangements, such as standard hours.  Such a strategic trade might 
reflect calculations of employer priorities (employers being more concerned about flexibilization 
than levels of hours per se) or employee priorities (employees being more divided and unclear 
about some aspects of flexibilization than about standard hours for core workers).  And it is also 
possible that such strategic action across work-time issues might emerge from how works 
councilors prioritize the needs of core, full time workers, over more marginal workers – where the 
former might be more protected by standard hours and other conditions for full-time workers, 
while temporary and fixed-term contracts are accepted because they affect those less central to 
union and works-councilor work organization.  If so, strategic action across work-time issues might 
reflect a classic insider-outsider trade-off by works councils. 
 
Whatever the particular logic behind such strategic action, anecdotes of union and works-councilor 
bargaining reveal instances where such broad trade offs across work-time issues were at work.  The 
1994 bargaining in the German metal industry, for instance, revealed strategic thinking on the part of                                                   Globalization and Working Time: Work-place Hours and Flexibility in Germany 
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unions and their works councils in trading-off work time reduction and job flexibilization.  That 
bargaining took place against a backdrop of economic recession and unprecedented losses in 
revealed comparative-advantage of the metal industry, reflected in the Standortdeutschland debate.4  
Employers sought cost relief via cuts in the holiday payment and increases in working-time corridor 
and flexibility, while the union’s demanded mainly a wage increase, a 12-month dismissals 
prohibition, and an agreement on employment safeguards (Richter et al. 2001).  The final agreement, 
reached on March 4, 1994, entailed a 2 percent wage increment and the opening clause known as 
Beschäftigungssicherungstarifverträge, allowing for limited work-time reduction without wage 
compensation in exchange for job guarantees, employers’ duty to take-over apprentices for a 
minimal period of 6 months, and extension of balancing time for working time accounts from 6 to 
12 months.  The latter was dear to employers because it significantly increased working time 
flexibility – decreasing the likelihood that employers must pay overtime premiums, as accumulated 
hours can be compensated-for by free time over a longer time period.  In short, amidst international 
competition and a domestic recession, IG Metall demanded and obtained an opening clause 
safeguarding employment via reduced hours.5  But it willingly accepted flexibilization (and forgoing 
higher wages), considering it a modest price to pay for increased work-time options.  Following this 
kind of logic, we might well expect unions and works councils to respond to globalization with quid-
pro-quos that give employers their flexibilization in exchange for protecting or lowering of standard 
hours. 
 
In sum, some simple reasoning on employer and employee preferences on working time, on how 
globalization can be expected to influence those preferences and political capacities, and on how 
work-place institutions influence both – generate broad expectations about globalization and work-
place working time.  We see globalization as having off-setting effects for working time, leaving the 
net effects an empirical question. But we do expect stronger, more positive (or less negative) effects 
of globalization for flexibilization than for standard hours.  And we expect the incidence of works 
councils to not only more strongly negatively affect standard hours than flexibilization, but also to 




                                                  
4 The net export rate ((X-M)/Production) in metalworking decreased from 30 per cent in 1989 (with an 
average for the 1980s of 30 per cent) to 23 per cent in 1990, down to the historical low of 15 per cent 
in 1991 (Statistisches Bundesamt, Aussenhandel, Fachserie 7, Teihe 7; and Statistisches 
Bundesamt, Produzierendes Gewerbe, Fachserie 4, Reihe 3.1). 
5 Employers’ proposal of a working time corridor that would have permitted longer hours was considered 
unacceptable for the trade union. B. Burgoon, D. Raess 
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3. EVIDENCE FROM ESTABLISHMENT SURVEYS IN GERMANY 
 
The rest of the paper tests these expectations on enterprise-level data of firms and work-hour 
conditions in Germany, capturing the full range of international economic exposure in an 
industrialized economy.  This paper uses data taken from the IAB Establishment Panel of the 
Institute for Employment Research (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, IAB) of the German 
Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, BA). The IAB Establishment Panel survey data 
are collected annually among a representative sample of employers since 1993 in western Germany 
and since 1996 in unified Germany.6  The base survey unit is the establishment or local production 
unit, rather than the legal or commercial entity of the firm. While the same establishments are 
surveyed annually, the data is augmented regularly to correct for plant closures, exits and newly 
founded units. The number of observations in the dataset has been growing over the years, from 
4,265 establishments in 1993 to close to 16,000 in recent years. The IAB Establishment Panel is a 
nationally representative dataset including establishments from all regions, industries and size, unlike 
other large scale German datasets such as the Hannover Firm Panel and the NIFA Panel that consist 
of a sample of establishments in the manufacturing sector in Lower Saxony and in the German 
machine-tool industry, respectively (Addison et al. 2004). 
 
The survey focuses on a wide range of employment-related matters.  Structural data such as 
employment level and composition, turnover and investments are collected alongside information 
on business policy and development, vocational training, government labor market subsidies, 
recruitment and dismissals, personnel search, training programs, wages and working hours.  While 
many of the questions in the questionnaire are repeated every year, some information is collected 
biennially or triennially.  For this reason, we consider estimations focused on both a 2002 cross-
section of establishments, providing the broadest cross-section of units surveyed, as well as a true 
and balanced panel for three years (1996, 1999, and 2002), as many years as the data allow for 
comparison across waves.  
 
3.1. DEPENDENT VARIABLES:  STANDARD HOURS AND JOB FLEXIBILIZATION 
 
The IAB surveys ask questions that measure both standard working hours and several features of 
job flexibility (Herrlinger et al. 2005).  For the former, the measure is weekly standard hours for full-
time workers, taken from the following question in the survey (English translation):  “How long is the 
presently agreed average weekly working time for full-time workers in your establishment?”   
                                                  
6 Generally, the questionnaire is filled in by the owner or senior management of the establishment in a B. Burgoon, D. Raess 
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Respondents are asked to report the weekly hours at the 1-digit level after the comma (e.g. 38.5 
hours per week).7  Although this measure misses part-time workers and the deviations across 
months and weeks in standard hours that inevitably occur (more on that below), agreed standard 
weekly hours for full-timers provides a direct and politically-salient measure of how much core 
employees of an establishment spend on the job on average. 
 
Such average weekly standard hours vary across and within industries in Germany, even though 
sector-level collective agreements remain important determinants of agreed and actual hours 
worked.  In recent years an increasing number of industries have introduced opening clauses to such 
agreements that delegate allocation of working hours to actors at firm or establishment level.   
“Working-time corridors” (Arbeitszeitkorridor) are one of the instruments used, allowing companies 
to reduce or extend working times within limits.  For instance, the 1994 collective agreement in the 
western chemicals industry provides for such a corridor, whereby the average work week of 37.5 
hours can be raised to 40 or lowered to 35 hours with proportional increases and reductions in pay, 
respectively.8  Other agreements contain opening clauses (Beschäftigungssicherungstarifverträge) for a 
working-time reduction without wage compensation in exchange for job guarantees.  In the banking 
sector, a firm can for a limited period of time decrease its average weekly work time from 39 to 31 
hours (with pay reduction) in exchange for employment guarantees.9  Finally, establishments not 
covered by collective bargaining can deviate at will from collectively-agreed standard hours.  And the 
share of establishments not covered by branch-level agreements has steadily increased in recent  
years to 55.4 and 77.9 per cent, respectively, in western and eastern Germany in 2001 (Kohaut and 
Schnabel 2003).10  In short, plant-level social partners do have considerable room for maneuver to 
decide the amount of hours worked in most industries.   
 
                                                                                                                                                      
personal interview. The reference date of the data collection is 30
th of June of each year.  
7 The weekly standard hours question was not asked in every wave of the panel, it is “missing” in 1994, 2000, 
2003 and 2005. 
8 By the mid-1990s, the textiles and clothing industries in western Germany had a similar arrangement, 
allowing extension or reduction of annual work time by as muchh as 130 hours in exchange for job security 
(EIRO 1997).  
9 By the mid-1990s, similar opening clauses existed in western printing and western iron and steel industries 
(with possible reduction of weekly work time from 35 to a minimum of 30 hours), and in western 
metalworking (reduction of weekly hours from 35 to either 30 or 29 hours depending on the region) (EIRO 
1997). A study of 151 metalworking establishments that have used such an arrangement between 1994 and 
1999 showed that the period of the agreement varied between one and sixty months, with agreements of 
twelve or more months accounting for about 60 percent of agreements (Richter 2002). In a 1997-8 WSI-
survey, agreements with a duration of more than one year accounted for 85 percent of all agreements – the 
industries sampled is here much broader, included public sector and privatized (e.g., utilities, post, railway) 
establishments (Richter 2002).  
10 Based on IAB Establishment Panel data. Between 1996 and 2001, the share of establishments covered by a 
branch-level collective agreement decreased by 9 per cent in the West and 5.5 per cent in the East.                                                   Globalization and Working Time: Work-place Hours and Flexibility in Germany 
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This shows up in the IAB data, where the sample mean is 38.9 hours per week, with a minimum of 
21 and a maximum of 56 hours per week and with the 1st-percentile being 33 hours and the 99th 
being 45 hours per week (see summary statistics in Appendix One).11  Across sectors, divided at the 
41-branch level, the branch with the highest average standard hours is “Hotels and Restaurants” 
with 40.6 hours, and the branch with the lowest average is “Manufacture of paper, printing and 
publishing,” with 37.2 hours.12  S u m m a r i z e d  a t  t h e  s a m e  b r a n c h  l e v e l ,  m o s t  o f  t h e s e  s e c t o r s  
experienced modest declines in average hours between 1996 and 2002 – from an average in the 
panel data of 40.6 in 1996 to 39 hours in 2002. 
 
Our measure of job flexibility is a composite variable of contract flexibility and working-time 
flexibility. With respect to employment contract flexibility, we consider the incidence of two atypical 
work contracts:  whether or not an enterprise has in the last year had employees with temporary 
work contracts (i.e., employment via a temporary work agency); and whether in the last year they 
have had employees with fixed-term contracts, such as arrangements to work a given set of weeks or 
months.  With respect to working-time flexibility, we consider the incidence of overtime (whether 
workers in the last year have worked overtime hours) and the presence of a working-time account.13  
Such a working-time account might appear ambiguous as a measure of flexibilization, since they 
increase workers’ sovereignty over the weekly distribution of hours. However, the negative 
individual and collective consequences of having a working-time account offset such gains in worker 
sovereignty:  on the one hand, working-time accounts decrease the likelihood that employees will 
work overtime hours at premium pay; on the other hand, the existence of accounts decreases the 
works councils’ ability to use co-determination over overtime as a bargaining-counter over other  
issues (Herrmann et al. 1999; Lindecke 2000). In any event, we measure the incidence of each of 
these aspects of flexibilization, recoded as binary variables, as follows: 0=no temporary work 
contracts in the establishment (no fixed-term contracts, no overtime, no working-time account); 
1=presence of temporary work contracts (presence of fixed-term contracts, overtime or working-
time account).   In the cross-sectional sample for 2002, the incidence of each varies substantially:   
                                                  
11 Although the IAB survey includes enterprises reporting fewer than 20 hours and more than 60 hours per 
week, we exclude these as highly likely to be mis-reported hours:  a work contract of 20 hours or fewer per 
week does not fit with existing definitions of full-time work (and the survey question about hours explicitly 
specifies “for full time workers”), and, on the other hand, a 60-hour week is difficult to reconcile with the 
condition in the survey question of an average agreed weekly working time.  Such restrictions, it should be 
emphasized, only drops some 20 observations in the three waves for the many thousands of establishments 
surveyed. 
12 In 2003, the collectively-agreed regular weekly hours for the main industries were: metalworking and 
electrical industry, 35 hours (East: 38); printing, 35 hours (38); textiles, 37 hours (40); chemicals, 37.5 hours 
(40); retail, 37.5 hours (38); wholesale and foreign trade, 38.5 hours (39); insurance, 38 hours (38); public 
service, 38.5 hours (40); construction, 39 hours (39); and private banking, 39 hours (39) (EIRO 2003). 
13 In 1996 the survey question refers to flexitime (Gleitzeit) and in 1999 and 2002 to working-time accounts 
(Arbeitszeitkonten). It has to be remembered that working time accounts are a recent invention.  B. Burgoon, D. Raess 
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with 68 percent of establishments having some overtime; 43 percent having working-time accounts; 
11 percent having temporary work contracts; and 39 percent having fixed-term contracts.   
Significantly and as one would expect, all four elements correlate positively and significantly with one 
another, with coefficients of correlation ranging from .19 to .36.   
 
These components were themselves analyzed separately, but yielded similar enough results that we 
have elected to report a composite measure of job flexibilization that combines the information of 
the components.  Our composite is a simple addition of the binary elements of flexibilization.  The 
number of elements included in the composite differs, however, across the cross-section and panel 
analyses, due to changes in the measurement of variables across different years of the panel, or to 
“missing” information about one or another variable-year.14 For the cross-section in 2002, thus, our 
composite variable is the sum of four variables (higher scores indicating greater flexibilization):  the 
sample’s average score being 1.62, with the full range of 0 to 4 represented among the enterprises.  
For the panel data, on the other hand, the composite covers only fixed-term and overtime accounts, 
ranging thus from 0 to 2, and averaging .91.  For analytical purposes, we recognize that this is not a 
true ordinal measure of flexibilization, since incidence of one of the components is not theoretically 
or politically the same as the incidence of another.  But we see the aspects of flexibilization as 
cumulative in the basic sense of capturing how much work-time and job flexibilization are present in 
a firm. 
 
3.2. EXPLANATORY VARIABLES: GLOBALISATION AND WORKS COUNCILS 
 
We report three measures of economic globalization (and consider a range of others in sensitivity 
tests), one of which is directly in the IAB survey and two of which can be surmised from information 
about branch or sector positions of enterprises.  The first measure is foreign sales, based on one of 
the IAB-dataset’s limited direct information on international pressure.  In every wave of the panel 
respondents are asked to report the share of foreign sales for the previous year.  While the 
question was asked directly in the first waves, since 1998 respondents have to provide the 
breakdown of sales for the four regions of West Germany, East Germany, the EMU countries, and 
the rest of the world, providing a basis for constructing the same measure.  Foreign sales, in any 
event, we define as the export share of total sales (X/sales) at the establishment level – the most 
                                                  
14 Overtime is measured over a time period of 6 months prior to 1999 (e.g. the question in the wave 1996 is: 
“Were overtime hours performed in your establishment in the first half of 1996”) compared to 12 months 
after 1999 (e.g. the question in the 2002 survey is:  “Were overtime hours performed in your establishment in 
the previous year, that is in 2001”). The question about temporary work contracts is missing in 1999, 2000 
and 2001.                                                   Globalization and Working Time: Work-place Hours and Flexibility in Germany 
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fine-grained globalization measure we have and that can exist in such a dataset.15  T h e  m a i n  
advantage is that foreign sales is an internal variable to the IAB Establishment Panel dataset, where 
the match between this measure and the establishment is very accurate.  The disadvantage is that 
the question is not asked of firms in the financial and some service sectors, tending to be less 
internationally exposed than many other sectors, and therefore plausibly introducing selection bias. 
 
Our second and third measures are generated from information external to the dataset but that can 
be matched to the respondent’s sector of employment.  This was facilitated by the change of 
industry classification in the IAB Establishment Panel operated in 2000 (wave 08), when the 
WZ93/NACE was adopted.16  With the answers to survey question “please indicate which branch of 
the industry your establishment is now active in using the industry classification table on the next 
page”, the sector of activity of each establishment in the NACE industry classification is known.  
Using this information, we compile various measures of trade and FDI flows at the same two-digit 
NACE classification level using statistics on imports, exports, production, and domestic and foreign 
employment for goods and services found in three databases:  the OECD’s STAN Database for 
Industrial Analysis17 and the OECD’s Statistics on International Trade in Services give imports, 
exports, production and domestic employment data for most of the sectors; and the Deutsche 
Bundesbank’s Kapitalverflechtung mit dem Ausland gives statistics on foreign employment by German 
MNCs and domestic employment controlled by foreign firms for a given sector. 
 
The constitution of a panel is complicated due to the change of industry classification in 2000.  
However, one notable advantage of the IAB Establishment Panel is that it is possible to track 
establishments on an annual basis, allowing us to impute the industry position of establishments in 
earlier waves from the industry position of establishments in one of the more recent waves (2000 
and following), such that the establishments in the older waves get recoded into the NACE industry 
classification.  By following establishments over time, this imputation technique restricts the sample 
to those establishments who participate in every wave of a given panel.  The related loss of 
information -- given that not all establishments in each wave are considered -- is a modest price to 
pay for the clear advantage of having the time dimension included into the analysis at all. 
 
These reliable statistics on branch or sector allow us to develop a range of globalization measures, 
of which we focus on and report two.  First, trade total share is the sum of exports and imports in 
the sector, as a proportion of total production in that sector ((X+M)/production).  Second, FDI total 
share is defined as the sum of the German MNCs’ foreign employment and the foreign MNCs-
                                                  
15 It is worth emphasizing that this is not a company-level, but an establishment-level measure. 
16 WZ93 is the German appellation of the NACE. 
17 Specifically, the STAN Indicators database and the STAN Industry database.  B. Burgoon, D. Raess 
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controlled domestic employment, as a proportion of the sum of total domestic employment and 
German MNCs’ foreign employment in a given sector.  It is worth emphasizing that measuring FDI 
openness in terms of (foreign and domestic) employment is similar to measuring FDI stocks, but 
unlike FDI flows and stocks are not so sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations.  The created 
globalization measures, in any event, are lagged by one year in relation to a given wave of the panel 
to take account of possible delays in negotiated responses to economic conditions.  In any event, we 
also consider in addition to the three reported measures several others – a measure of foreign 
ownership (found in the IAB survey waves), and of export orientation, import-penetration, net 
export shares, and outward and inward FDI – all of which can be built up using similar methods to 
those for FDI and trade shares. 
 
Works council incidence.  The works/staff council variable, present in each wave, is a binary variable 
that takes the value of one if the establishment has a works/staff council and zero otherwise.  The 
expectations, in line with the discussion above, is that having a works council ought to be associated 
with fewer hours but likely greater flexibilization.  Because we are interested in the role that works 
council incidence might have in mediating the effects of globalization, we restrict the sample to firms 
with five or more employees.  German labor law that stipulates that works councils are authorized 
(but not mandatory) in all establishments with five or more employees.  Restricting the sample, thus, 
is crucial to investigating potential differentiated work-floor consequences of the workforce’s real 
choice for or against the set-up of a works council under globalization.  In the cross-sectional sample, 
the percentage of enterprises with a works council is 38.6 percent (50.3 percent in the panel 
sample). 
 
We can now state in terms of these parameters for standard hours, flexibilization, globalization and 
works councils our main expectations:  that all the globalization measures ought to correlate more 
strongly positively or less negatively with flexibilization than with standard hours, and that works 
councils ought to more positively mediate globalization’s implications for flexibilization than for 
standard hours.  Figure One provides a descriptive-statistic illustration that this is borne out in the 
data (the cross-sectional data is used).  Shown are how average standard hours and flexibilization 
are correlated with average trade openness, where one restricts the data sample to establishments 
without works council (the scatterplots on the left-hand panel) and to establishments with works 
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Figure One: Trade and weekly hours and flexibilization (with and without works councils) 
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The patterns for standard hours suggest that where works councils are not present, the relationship 
is weakly positive, but that when works councils are present trade tends to reduce standard hours 
for full-time workers.  On the other hand, the lower two scatterplots for flexibilization show the 
opposite pattern:  that trade has little impact on flexibilization where works councils are absent, but 
tends to have significantly higher flexibilization when they are present.  Note also that the presence 
of works councils also appears to have negative effects for standard hours (shown by the lower 
hours on the right-hand than the left-hand panel), but to have positive effects for flexibilization 
(shown by the higher flexibilization scores on the right-hand than on the left-hand panel).  The same 
sort of illustrative analysis with other measures of globalization yield similar patterns.  Such 
illustration, however, is only a very rough hint of what the data might harbor, not taking into 
account the much-finer-grained establishment-level variation, nor the possible effects of a range of 
other factors. 
 
Controls.  This brings us to the controls.  We consider a range of explanatory variables familiar in the 
extant literature as control variables on working time. Establishment size, measured as total 
employees (including trainees but excluding temporary workers), can be expected to be negatively 
associated with standard hours because larger plants tend to enjoy economies of scale that reduce 
unit costs, allowing for more workforce power to decrease hours (Cappelli 1985). A positive 
association is expected between size and job flexibility as large firms tend to have own HR 
department with legal expertise to organize internal flexibility (Thelen and Kume 1999).  The 
location variable takes the value of one if the establishment is based in East Germany and zero if it is 
located in West Germany. There is a strong expectation that employees in establishments in the 
East work longer hours. This is because significant differences remain in the statutory and 
collectively agreed working hours between West and East, despite the labor movement’s attempts 
to fully equalize conditions across the national territory as a result of the reunification agreement 
(EIRO 2003; Raess 2006). However, there is a less clear cut expectation with regard to job 
flexibilization. On the one hand, reflecting the greater leaning towards neoliberalism of at least some 
employers in East Germany, greater flexibilization can be expected there (Schroeder 2000, 2003). 
On the other hand, if union organizing is a precondition for organizing internal flexibility, then the 
correlation should be negative (Schroeder 2000). We also control for skill level by the proportions 
of unskilled and production workers, and expect both measures to be negatively associated with 
hours. 
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We use an external unemployment variable, defined as the change in unemployment at t-1 measured 
at the regional level of the Bundesländer.18 The broad expectation is that an increase in 
unemployment is associated with increases in hours worked and in job flexibilization, because high 
unemployment weakens trade unions and other worker representation and empowers employers 
(Wallerstein 1998). But rising unemployment can also push unions and works councilors to demand 
shorter hours to safeguard employment -- as the campaign for the working time reduction in the 
German metalworking has shown -- such that how unemployment affects working hours is an 
empirical question.  
 
The status of an establishment as a single establishment-firm is a binary variable that simply equals 
one when the establishment is a single independent plant and zero otherwise (e.g., subsidiary of a 
larger firm, headquarters of a company). We expect the single establishment-firm status to be 
positively associated with standard hours and negatively with job flexibilization -- such firms tend to 
be smaller, less profitable, which altogether makes them less likely to have the financial resources 
and expertise to implement complicated flexibilization schemes and policies. The establishment age 
is also a binary variable where the coding one is given to the more recent plants that have been 
founded in and after 1990, and zero to older plants. The intuition here is that newer plants have a 
longer working week and more flexible conditions, partly because they are more difficult to organize 
by the trade union movement, and partly because they are less likely to join an employers’ 
organization and hence to follow the pattern bargaining (Hassel 1999). Finally, we take the survey 
question used to generate our measure of kinds of ownership to create a private – public variable, 
with the value one associated to public ownership and zero to private ownership. The broad 
expectation is that the public status of an establishment stands in a negative association with both 
hours and job flexibilization, because public sector labor regulations tend to be more stable and 
worker-friendly (Keller 2004). Due to large number of missing values, the three controls 
establishment status, size, and age are not used in the panel analysis.19   
   
3.3. ESTIMATION STRATEGY  
 
Both standard hours and for our composite of work-time flexibilization, we consider both cross-
sectional estimations for 2002, and estimations from a true, balanced panel from 1996 to 2002.  The 
former captures the most representative cross-section of establishments in the data, and the latter 
allow us to take more explicit account of time dynamics in that data.  Standard hours is a continuous 
                                                  
18 Unemployment is measured for employees in a dependent employment relationship (abhaengige 
Erwerbspesonen) (Bundesagentur für Arbeit – Statistik (Zeitreihen), 2007, Arbeitsmarkt in Zahlen, Januar).  
19 For instance, there are 435 missing values for the variable single establishment-firm and 488 for the 
ownership question in the 2002 wave.  B. Burgoon, D. Raess 
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variable, for which coefficients are OLS, but the flexibilization composites are ordinal measures 
ranging from 0 to 4 for the cross-section (0 to 2 for the panel), making ordinal probit the more 
appropriate estimator.  Given the presence of unit-level heteroskedasticity and correlation, together 
with the panel’s unit-domination and small-number of observations per unit (three years, spaced by 
three years), we combine these OLS or ordered-probit estimation of coefficient estimates with the 
Huber-White robust-cluster “sandwich” estimator of standard errors, clustered over branches (41 
branch categories).  This provides correct coverage in the face of any correlations among errors 
within clusters, including correlation within and between units.  As robustness checks, however, we 
consider alternative estimators – e.g. FGLS-correcting –yielding results that are stronger but in the 
same direction as the robust-cluster results.   
 
The base models for standard hours and flexibilization, respectively, take the following general 
forms: 
 
Standard weekly hoursit = α + β1Globalizationit-1 +β2Works-councilit +  β3Globalizationit-1*      (1) 
Works-councilit+ β4Controlsit-1  + Industryi + Yeart + εit   
 
Flexibilizationit = α + β1Globalizationit-1 +β2Works-councilit +  β3Globalizationit-1*                    (2) 
Works-councilit+ β4Controlsit-1 + Industryi + Yeart + εit   
  
The base models consider how works council presence might mediate how globalization affects 
standard hours and flexibilization by interacting globalization with works-council incidence, taking 
fuller advantage of the data than splitting the panel by such incidence.  The expectation in all 
estimations is that the effects of globalization for standard hours be more negative or less 
positive than for job flexibilization, and that works councils more strongly negatively mediate 
these effects for standard hours than for flexibilization.  In terms of the models, this means that 
we expect β1Globalizationit-1  c o e f f i c i e n t s  t o  b e  m o r e  n e g a t i v e l y  o r  l e s s  p o s i t i v e l y  s i g n e d  a n d  
significant for standard hours than for flexibilization.  We also expect β2Works-councilit  
coefficients to be negatively related to standard hours, and either less so or perhaps positively-
related for flexibilization.  Finally, we expect the interaction term (β3Globalizationit-1*Works-
councilit) to be statistically significant and negative in the case of standard hours, and less so or 
perhaps positive and significant in the case of flexibilization.      
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For the cross-section versions of (1) and (2), of course, there is no variation across time (hence 
the subscript t in the above notation drops out).  For the estimations of job flexibilization, we  
are more interested in the cross-sectional results for the 4-point scale composite than in the 2-
point panel composite, because the former provides a more encompassing measure of our 
theoretical interest in work-time and job flexibilization.     
 
Our preferred models also consider the globalization measures separately, mainly because 
these pose off-setting constraints on the sample of enterprises for which we have full 
information, such that the sample size is significantly reduced by simultaneous inclusion of the 
globalization measures on the right-hand side.  To consider the possible net effects among the 
globalization measures, however, we do consider estimations with all three together, and these 
tend to pose only modest collinearity problems (e.g. with variance-inflation factor scores for 
individual globalization measures always below 10 in the cross-sections).  In all estimations, 
though, the FDI and trade measures of globalization are lagged one year (but not the foreign 
sales directly in the survey). 
 
All estimations, in any event, include 10 industry dummies (ui), to account for unobserved effects of 
industries and to further address unit-level heteroskedasticity.20  The panel estimations for both 
standard hours and flexibilization include also dummies for year of the survey, to account for 
unobserved time effects.  Both such sets of dummies are highly jointly significant.  And for the panel 
version of standard hours, estimation form (1), we also report results with and without a lagged 








                                                  
20 We use 10 industry dummies: (1) Agriculture, hunting and forestry fishing; (2) Mining and quarrying, 
electricity, gas and water supply; (3) Manufacturing Industries; (4) Construction; (5) Trade and Repair; (6) 
Transportation and Communication; (7) Financial Intermediation; (8) Industrial services; (9) Other services; 
(10) Non-industrial organizations, public administration. 
21 We show only the unlagged dependent variable for the job flexibilization. B. Burgoon, D. Raess 
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4. RESULTS 
 
Tables One and Two summarize the results for standard hours and for flexibilization, respectively.  
The first two columns summarize results from the 2002 cross-section, with all the globalization 
variables included simultaneously, first without interactions with incidence of works councils 
(column 1) and then with such interactions (column 2).  The remaining six columns summarize 
results from the panel data, showing separately the effects of foreign sales, total FDI, and trade, 
conditional upon incidence of works councils.  For each globalization measure and its interaction 
with works-council incidence, we show two estimations – one with and one without a lagged 
dependent variable.   
 
Before turning to the main results, it is worth mentioning that most of the controls performed in 
line with expectation.  Larger companies tended to have fewer standard hours, significantly so in the 
case of the cross-sectional analyses.  East-German location tended to correlate significantly 
positively with hours.  And regional unemployment tended to correlate negatively significantly.   
Industry and year dummies were very highly jointly significant.  And in the panel runs, lagged hours 
were highly significantly correlated with existing hours – also tending to increase R-squared by some 
thirty percent on average.  The other parameters tended to be insignificant.  The overall 
performance of the models was modest – with adjusted R-squared never above .67 – and stayed so 
even when we considered throwing virtually all measures from the survey into the alternative 
estimations.   B. Burgoon, D. Raess 
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Table One:  Standard weekly hours and globalization (Dependent Variable:  Standard Weekly 
Hours) 
  
                        Cross-section           Panel 
(2002)             (1996-2002) 
 (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Foreign salest-1  -0.079**  0.002  0.057  -0.012      
  (0.030) (0.021) (0.041) (0.028)         
FDIt-1  -5.225     -4.847      33.808***  12.803**     
  (6.587) (5.854)     (11.734)  (6.259)    
Trade t-1  1.496  4.308**       9.018***  2.615** 
  (1.279)  (1.671)       (2.685)  (1.278) 
Works Council  -11.167***  -7.196***  -9.022***  -4.540***  -2.971 -1.773*  -4.686***  -2.141** 
  (1.595) (2.319) (1.719) (0.869)  (2.038) (0.954) (1.696) (0.816) 
Foreign sales* 
Works council 






    
FDI * Work 
council 
  -2.100 
(9.694) 





Trade * Works 
council 
  -4.676* 
(2.432) 




Hourst-1    0.631***   0.596***   0.690*** 
     (0.060)   (0.071)   (0.077) 
Size  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.001 -0.000  -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 



















Unskilled prop.  2.416  2.124  2.258  0.196 1.033  -0.130 -0.825 -0.877 



















Unemploymentt-1 -2.078*** -2.111*** -1.587*** 0.333  -1.604*** 0.821  -1.419*** -0.250 
  (0.600) (0.619) (0.338) (0.434)  (0.358) (0.574) (0.312) (0.527) 
Stand-alone  firm  1.208  1.122  - -  - - - - 
  (0.778)  (0.781)  - -  - - - - 
Age  0.301  0.205  - -  - - - - 
  (0.737)  (0.735)  - -  - - - - 
Public  ownership  -2.654  -3.733  - -  - - - - 
  (2.714)  (2.356)  - -  - -   - 
Constant  391.7*** 390.4*** 406.4*** 148.9***  404.7*** 162.4*** 406.5*** 125.9*** 
  (2.102) (2.074) (1.787) (24.31)  (1.943) (28.23) (1.909) (30.79) 
10 industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
3 yearly dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  5734 5734 5059 3342  6558 4303 5100 3350 
R-squared  0.31 0.31 0.38 0.63  0.32 0.52 0.44 0.67 
OLS coefficients with robust standard errors (in parentheses), clustered over branch.   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% or lower.  
 
Reference: IAB Establishment Panel, waves 2002; 1996-1999-2002, remote data access via the Research 
Data Centre (FDZ) of the Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) 
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Turning to the main results, both the cross-sectional and panel results paint a similar picture – that 
measures of globalization tend in general to have either a negative or insignificant direct effect on 
standard hours, but that these measures of globalization tend to significantly increase standard hours 
among firms without works council representation but significantly decrease such hours among firms 
with such representation.  Column (1) provides a snapshot of the unmediated effects, suggesting 
that foreign sales has the strongest and negative direct effect on standard hours, net of the 
insignificant negative effect of FDI and insignificant positive effect of trade openness.  These effects 
are net of a range of controls, including works councils.  And they provide modest support for the 
idea that, in general, at least the foreign sales measure of globalization – the measure most tightly 
matched to the enterprise level of the survey, though excluding some less tradable industries – 
tends to be good news for the standard working hours of full time workers.  These results are very 
similar to what emerges, also in the cross-section, of considering each globalization measure 
separately.  Substantively, however, the effects are modest, in that a 1 percent increase in foreign 
sales yields a .0079 hour decrease in weekly standard hours. Such would imply that moving from 0 
to 50 percent foreign sales – roughly moving from the 10th to the 90th percentile in the sample – 
predicts a decrease of .40 hours per week. 
 
Column (2), however, suggest that the interaction with works councils is in general strong, in a way 
that modifies the message of the general, direct effects.  In all cases, the results for the globalization 
parameters must be interpreted together with the works council and the interaction term.  And the 
results are in line with expectations above, in that all the interaction terms are negative, and 
statistically significant at the .01 and .1 levels for foreign sales and trade, respectively – and the three 
globalization measures are each jointly significant with their interaction term and the works council 
component.  This suggests that the predicted effects of the globalization measures are more negative 
and less positive in establishments with works councils than with those without.  The globalization 
variables can be read as the conditional effects of globalization in establishments without works 
councils (that is, where the incidence of works councils is 0). In establishments without works 
councils, thus, trade significantly positively affects standard hours, while foreign sales and FDI tend to 
have no significant effect on such hours.  The substantive size of this conditional effect for trade is 
modest: a one percent increase in total trade yields an increase in .004 hours per work week for full 
time workers.  And moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile in trade (roughly from .02 to 90.2 
percent of production) yields an increase from 39.3 to 40.4 standard hours per week.  With works 
councils, however, further analysis shows that the coefficients for all three globalization measures 
become negative and in all three cases statistically significant at the .05 (for foreign sales) or .1 level 
(for trade and for FDI).  In the case of foreign sales, the substantive results under such conditions 
(where enterprises have a works council) are stronger than for the unmediated results:  a one B. Burgoon, D. Raess 
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percent increase in foreign sales predicts a decrease in standard weekly hours of .013 hours per 
week, and moving again from 0 to 50 percent of foreign sales predicts .65 fewer hours per week. 
 
The remaining columns – columns (3) through (8) – summarize the panel results for standard hours.  
These paint a somewhat sharper picture in line with the cross-sectional results – but again very 
much in line with expectation.  The results for foreign sales are the weakest in this regard, in that 
the negative interaction with works council-incidence is significant only in the estimation without 
lagged standard hours (column 3).  There the results are very similar to the conditional effects of 
foreign sales just reported for the cross-section.  But with the lagged dependent variable (column 4), 
the interaction loses significance; it is worth mentioning, however, that the individual components 
(foreign sales and works council) and the interaction term are jointly significant and signed in the 
expected directions.  Columns (5) and (6) show how total FDI tends to significantly increase 
standard hours where establishments have no works council representation, and the substantive size 
of this increase is more substantial than that reported for foreign sales:  in the case of the estimation 
without the lagged dependent variable, a one percent increase in total FDI raises standard weekly 
hours by .034 hours per week (.013 hours per week for the lagged-dependent-variable estimation in 
column 6).  Where works councils are present, however, this effect becomes negative and modestly 
significant for most of the distribution (where FDI is above the 20th and below the 90th percentile).  
Finally, trade shows the same strong pattern of interaction with works councils, where increased 
trade significantly increases standard hours where establishments have no works councils.  Here the 
substantive effect is between that for foreign sales and total FDI, and in the case of the estimation in 
column (7) (without the lagged dependent variable) the results are somewhat stronger than the 
cross-section results reported in column (2):  for the panel results, moving from the 25th to the 75th 
percentile in trade (roughly from .02 to 90.2 percent of production) yields an increase from 39.6 to 
41.1 standard hours per week (note that the substantive effect declines by almost two-thirds, and to 
below the cross-section results, when one adds the lagged dependent variable).   
 
These results are substantively modest, to be sure.  But they show a clear pattern of globalization 
influencing standards weekly hours – modestly negatively in general, but strongly mediated by 
incidence of works councils.  Where works councils are present, globalization increases sweat for 
core workers, but when establishment workers choose to elect a works council to represent them 
in negotiations, globalization becomes a friend rather than foe to their work hours.  Such results 
stand up to alternative estimators, such as FGLS estimation with random or fixed effects, yield often 
stronger results in line with theoretical expectations. And the results are virtually identical if one 
log-transforms the dependent variable standard hours.  They are also identical if one considers all 
standard hours (including suspiciously low and high reported hours).  And the basic patterns stand                                                   Globalization and Working Time: Work-place Hours and Flexibility in Germany 
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up if one considers fewer or other arrays of controls, including the inclusion of the job flexibilization 
measures on the right-hand side.22  Further, the results are similar with other measures of 
globalization, including import penetration and foreign ownership.   
 
Table Two summarizes the results for job flexibilization.  Columns (1) through (5) show the 
patterns from the cross-section data, with the 4-point measure of flexibilization, and coluns (6) 
through (8) show the results for the 2-point measure on the panel data.  Here, the controls perform 
broadly in line with expectation, with size significantly though substantively modestly spurring 
flexibilization; proportion of unskilled workers correlating negatively with flexibilization; stand-alone 
firms being less likely to introduce the flexibilization standards; regional unemployment tends to 
correlate positively with such flexibilization; newer establishments having more flexibilization, and 
public ownership modesly more.  East-German sites, however, tend in the 4-point cross-sectional 
composite to be less likely to flexibilize, whereas in the panel they are more likely to do so.  Why 
the former might be so is unclear to us, but one possibility is that temp work might be generally less 
developed as an institution and overtime less necessary in settings where the standard hours are so 
high, and from supplemental analyses discussed above where we find that such elements of 
flexibilization correlate negatively with standard hours. 
 
The main results are a striking contrast to those for standard hours for full-time workers – and 
clearly in line with expectations developed above.  Here, the general pattern is that globalization 
measures tend to significantly spur flexibilization, and that works councils tend not only themselves 
to spur flexibilization but to either not diminish or to even strengthen globalization’s positive effect.  
The first three columns show the results taking the globalization measures separately, where in all 
cases having a works council tends to make the effect of globalization on flexibilization more positive 
– significantly so in the case of FDI and works councils interaction (column 2).  In the case of foreign 
sales, the interaction is weakest, but the main positive effect strongest:  the main punch line being 
that (even) in establishments without works councils, statistically-significantly increases in foreign 







                                                  
22 Flexibilization tends to correlate significantly negatively with standard hours, a plausible pattern given that 
standard hours and flexibilization might well be imperfect substitutes – as discussed above. B. Burgoon, D. Raess 
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Table Two:  Work-time Flexibilization and Globalization 
(Dependent Variable:  Composite Variable of Contract and Work-time Flexibilization) 
 
            Cross-section                                         Panel  
            (2002)a                                  (1996-2002 all industries) b                    
 (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Foreign salest-1  0.007***     0.008*** 0.009*** 0.007***    
  (0.002)     (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)    
FDIt-1   -0.07    0.357*  0.039    -0.637*   
    (0.208)   (0.210) (0.302)   (0.372)  
Trade t-1    -0.025  -0.077  -0.003    -0.031 
    (0.093)  (0.076)  (0.106)    (0.096) 
Works-Council  0.996*** 0.863*** 1.051*** 1.003*** 0.957*** 1.083*** 0.84***  1.047*** 
  (0.053) (0.076) (0.083) (0.054) (0.102) (0.074) (0.093) (0.106) 
























  0.264** 
(0.131) 
Size  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000  0.000*  0.000** 



















Unskilled prop.  -0.178***  -0.133** -0.071  -0.168*  -0.171* -0.017  0.012 0.118 



















Unemploymentt-1  0.06  0.072*  -0.009  0.003 0.003 0.057*  0.052*  0.010 
  (0.04)  (0.038) (0.041) (0.048) (0.048) (0.032) (0.029) (0.256) 
Stand-alone  firm  -0.277*** -0.182*** -0.159**  -0.285*** -0.285***      
  (0.039) (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.043) (0.044)      
Age  0.118*** 0.115*** 0.109*** 0.119*** 0.118***      
  (0.023) (0.03)  (0.039) (0.034) (0.033)      
Public  ownership  0.201**  -0.01 0.073 0.149 0.160      
  (0.102) (0.096) (0.08)  (0.145) (0.140)      
10 industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
3  yearly  dummies  No No No No No Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations  9242 10271  7580 5752 5752 5086 6586 5120 
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
-12313.5  -13852.4  -10244.8  -7705.5 -7702.8 -4529.1 -6066.5 -4614.8 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.13 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.18 0.16 0.17 
Ordered probit coefficients with robust standard errors (in parentheses), clustered over branch.  Cuts, and industry and 
year dummies not shown.   
a  Dependent variable is categorical measure of work-time flexibilization, ranging from 0 to 4, representing unweighted sum 
of: fixed-term contract (yes=1; no=0); work-time accounts (yes=1; no=0); overtime (yes=1; no=0); temporary work 
contracts (yes=1; no=0). 
b  Dependent variable work-time flexibilization (from 0 to 2), representing the uweighted sum of:  fixed-term contract 
(yes=1; no=0); and work-time accounts (yes=1; no=0). 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% or lower.  
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The substantive size of this effect can be captured by in-sample counterfactual predictions based on 
the model in column (1), taking all controls at their means and varying levels of foreign sales, works 
council incidence and their interaction.  Among establishments without works councils, moving from 
the 10th through the 90th percentile in the sample distribution of foreign sales – from 0 to 90 
percent of sales – the model predicts a statistically significant increase in the probability that an 
establishment have high flexibilization (a composite score of 3 or 4): a doubling in the chance of 
having high flexibility, .1227 probability at 0 foreign sales, and a .26 probability at 90 percent foreign 
sales.  Where works councils are present, furthermore, this effect of globalization is similar:  a 
predicted probability of .45 that establishments will have high flexibilization (3 or 4 on the composite 
index) when foreign sales are zero; but a .71 probability when foreign sales are 90 percent. 
 
Columns (4) and (5) show the results of taking all the globalization measures together, yielding a 
significant decrease in the sample size but allowing some judgment of how the globalization effects 
compare to one another.  Column (4) shows the general effect, controlling for but not interacting 
with works councils.  And here we see that both foreign sales and FDI are significantly positively 
correlated with increases in flexibilization; trade is not significant.  The substantive effects are similar 
to those just reported for the conditional effects in column (1) when works councils are present.  In 
any event, the conditional effects show that works councils have a more modest and less negative 
mediating effect on how globalization affects flexibilization than we saw in the standard hours 
estimations.  The interaction is modestly significant and positive in only one case, for FDI.   
 
Columns (6) through (8) show that these results hold up when one considers a panel context for 
the years 1996 through 2002 on a 2-point measure of flexibilization (for the incidence of fixed-term 
contracts and working-time accounts).  For foreign sales, the results are substantively similar to 
those in column (1) and (5) – a significant spurring of flexibilization regardless of works-council 
incidence.  For FDI and trade, however, the interaction is stronger and in a positive direction – such 
that one can surmise from the estimates that globalization has little or perhaps a negative effect on 
flexibilization where enterprises have no works councils representation, but significantly more such 
flexibilization where works councils are present. 
 
As with the results for standard working hours, these results stand up to a range of robustness and 
sensitivity checks.  Most importantly the results are broadly similar to the disaggregated estimates of 
each component of flexibilization – with one exception, that works-council incidence tends to 
modestly diminish how globalization increases overtime incidence.  Also, step-wise exclusion and 
inclusion of various controls do not change the main results.  And alternative estimators (e.g. 
ordered logit) and calculations of standard errors also leave the main results intact. B. Burgoon, D. Raess 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
These results show that economic globalization has significant and quite varying implications for 
enterprise-level working hours for full-time workers and for job flexibilization, and that those 
implications appear also to be mediated in different ways by the presence of enterprise-level worker 
representation.  Consistent with a “globaphilic” take on globalization and working time, the general 
(unmediated) results for standard hours suggest that globalization may sooner lighten than increase 
the work-time load for full-time core workers.  But consistent with the “globaphobic” take, the 
results for the composite of job flexibilization (incidence of overtime, temporary work, fixed-
contract work, and working-time accounts) all suggest that economic globalization tends to increase 
flexibilization.  Such apparently contradictory patterns are actually consistent with our expectations, 
given how employers can be expected to be more committed to flexibilization than to raising hours 
for core workers, and given how core employees can be expected to defend their hours and often 
prefer some kinds of flexibilization. 
 
Equally important, however, are the varying results for how works-council representation mediates 
these above effects of globalization.  With respect to standard hours, we expected and find evidence 
that the creation of a works council creates political bargaining leverage at the level of the firm to 
strengthen core-employee interests in protecting or lowering standard hours for full time 
employees – such that globalization in such settings actually tends to modestly reduce hours for 
such core workers.  Without such works councils, conversely, we expect and empirically show that 
globalization spurs total working hours of full-time workers – plausibly an artifact of weaker 
representation of such workers in the face of globalization and competitiveness-sensitive employers.  
With respect to job flexibilization, however, we expect and find evidence that works council 
incidence is generally less important in mediating the flexibilizing effects of globalization.  And to the 
extent that works councils do play a mediating role, it is in a positive direction – that is, increasing 
the tendency of globalization to spur flexibilization.  This pattern, again somewhat counterintuitive, 
makes sense in light of worker preferences works councils putatively represent, and in light of the 
bargaining dynamics between works-councils and employers in setting elements of flexibility, where 
works councils (and unions) have been seen to exchange flexibilization to secure a lowering of hours 
and job protections for core workers. 
 
We have, thus, results that clarify in some counter-intuitive ways the relationship between 
economic globalization and working-time patterns in industrialized countries – contributing to our 
understanding of how globalization affects industrialized political economies, and of where 
differences in working time come from.  To be sure, all of these results are substantively modest, B. Burgoon, D. Raess 
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and they are based on evidence from one country.  But the data is a very broad and representative 
sample of thousands of enterprises over almost ten years, capturing the full gamut of a nation’s 
variation in globalization and work-place working-time experiences.  The results of analysis of these 
data, moreover, are robust to a range of estimation techniques and specifications. 
 
Further research should extend the theoretical and empirical findings of this study in at least two 
basic ways.  First, there needs to be more research into the range of experiences in other countries, 
where worker and employee representation are different than the relatively organized German 
setting. The external validity of the existing study is helped by the data capture a lot of variation not 
only in industry, skill and exposure to globalization, but includes a majority of enterprises without 
work-place representation.  But other national settings differ in enough cultural and national-level 
and political terms to make studies in other national settings meaningful – especially if data can be 
found with the coverage and detail of the IAB panel.  Second, there needs to be more thought and 
research into how working time arrangements set at various levels of governance interact.  Work-
place rules and practices are crucial, but are also embedded in sectoral and regional legal 
arrangements, as well as national and (in the case of the European Union) supranational regulations 
on working-time.  The question, here, is whether the same uneven effects of globalization, mediated 
by worker representation, show up on other levels of work-time regulation, and how and whether 
these other levels affect and are affected by the work-place level examined in this study.   
 
The existing findings, in the meantime, are a reminder of the complexity of globalization’s effects for 
political-economic life – extending in uneven ways not only to the terms of employment and wage 
experiences of workers, but also their working time.  And the findings are, more importantly, a 
reminder that the responses of workers and employers to various faces of economic globalization 
leave open substantial room for agency, resting on the work-place political representation of 
workers.  Such representation constitutes a choice in most political economies, certainly in the 
German setting surveyed here – as well as in most other industrialized settings, albeit in less 
institutionalized forms.  And the theory and evidence above show that this choice can matter very 
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APPENDIX I.- SUMMARY STATISTICS, CROSS-SECTION, YEAR 2002 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min Max 
Standard hours  15432  388.8744  20.96  210 560 
Job Flexibilization  15611  1.619115  1.184819  0 4 
Foreign Sales  12135  6.843098  17.57611  0 100 
FDI  12869  .1613034  .1673083  .007 1.047 
Trade  9241  .3844321  .5400595  .001 5.879 
Works Council  15634  .3859537   .4868353   0 1 
Size  15683  186.7022  832.54  1 50524 
Location East-Germ.  15683  .3471912  .4760924  0 1 
Unskilled prop.  15682  .2073075  .2656795  0 1 
Production workers prop.  15682  .4352164  .3495306  0 1 
Unemployment  15683  -.2404387  .458566  -1 0.6 
Stand-alone firm  15245  .6993768  .4585441  0 1 
Age  15444  .3652551  .4815172  0 1 
Public Ownership  14925  .1091457  .3118324  0 1 
 




APPENDIX II.- SUMMARY STATISTICS, PANEL, YEARS 1996,1999 AND 
2002 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min Max 
Standard hours  8816  389.2  20.16  220 560 
Job Flexibilization  8942  .9081861  .8042792  0 2 
Foreign Sales  6112  7.143979  18.20666  0 100 
FDI  7520  .1177742  .1387313  .002 1.047 
Trade  5642  .2887577  .4727083  .001 5.879 
Works Council  8926  .5025767  .5000214  0 1 
Size  8979  352.1839  1242.472  1 48711 
Location East-Germ.  8979  .4714333  .4992111  0 1 
Unskilled prop.  8965  .2066973  .2606335  0 1 
Production workers prop.  8966  .4463018  .3478537  0 1.007874 
Unemployment  8979  -.3015815  .5623438  -1.5 0.9 
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